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We obtain time series estimates of the long run growth rates of 17 OECD
countries, and test the hypothesis that these are the same across countries. We
¯nd that we cannot reject this hypothesis for the ¯rst and last three decades of the
20th century. We conclude that: (i) there are few, if any, feasible policies available
that have a signi¯cant e®ect on long run growth rates, and; (ii) any policies that can
raise national growth rates must be international in scope. The results therefore
have bleak implications for the ability of countries to a®ect their long run growth
rates.
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11 Introduction
Following the growth models of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), there is a substantial
amount of theoretical evidence to suggest long run national growth rates respond to a
range of economic variables. These theories contrast sharply with the neo-classical view,
in which long run growth rates are largely independent of economic policies (Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) and Parente and Prescott (2000) and Hall and Jones (1999)).
Both views enjoy some support from empirical studies where a broad array of potential
explanatory variables are considered across 100 or more countries. Many of the variables
in these studies, however, are not especially relevant to policy makers in developed market
economies.1 Thus a recent, but rapidly growing literature has emerged, that focuses on
the sources of di®erences in growth rates among the set of relatively developed economies,
such as the G7 and OECD.2 Indeed, since much of the theoretical endogenous growth
literature is explicitly concerned with policies such as R&D subsidies, patent protection
and taxation, and is calibrated using G7 or US data, it is appropriate that these theories
also be tested in sub-samples of developed market economies.3
Following this recent literature, therefore, we ask whether the di®erences in economic
policies that exist among the set of developed market economies, have any observable
impact on their relative long run growth rates? Moreover we propose a particularly
parsimonious approach to obtaining an answer. Using Maddison's (1995) long run data,
1For example, Barro and Lee (1994) include measures of political instability and life expectancy among
their explanatory variables. While these are interesting from an economic development perspective, they
are not part of the usual portfolio of policy options facing policy makers of developed market economies.
2For example Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) ¯nd evidence that human capital has a signi¯cant im-
pact on growth rates in OECD economies, and Guellec and de la Potterie (2001), ¯nd similar evidence
for R&D policies. Other recent OECD studies that tend to support these results include Bassanini,
Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001), Scarpetta, Bassanini, Pilat and Schreyer (2000) and Bassanini, Scar-
petta and Visco (2000). Similarly Kneller, Bleany and Gemmell (1999) provide evidence that ¯nancial
policies can a®ect long run growth rates in OECD countries. A much more cautionary survey of the
relationship between human capital and growth, in these countries, consistent with the ¯ndings herein,
is Temple (2001).
3For example see Caballero and Ja®e (1993), Pecorino (1993), Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and Howitt
(1999).
2we estimate the mean growths rates for each country and then use the estimated error
variance to test whether the di®erences in growth rates are signi¯cant. If the alternative
policy mixes employed across countries have had signi¯cant e®ects on long run growth
rates, we should be able to reject the hypothesis that mean growth rates are the same
across countries.
From a policy perspective our results are stark. We ¯nd that for the ¯rst and last three
decades of the 20th century, we cannot, at any reasonable level of con¯dence, reject the
hypothesis that all the countries were on identical balanced growth paths. Thus, except
for the decades around WWII, we ¯nd no evidence of country speci¯c e®ects on long run
growth rates. This implies that the policies chosen, among the range of feasible policy
alternatives, had no consequences for each countries long run growth rates. The only
exception to this is if the impact of the policies is international in scope, for example via
large and ubiquitous technology spill-overs. In either case the results suggest that that
the growth rate is primarily determined by international factors, and that the range of
feasible policies for increasing the long run growth rate, is very limited.
2 The Data
By way of previewing our main results, it is instructive to consider a visual inspection
of the data.4 The data, denoted yit, used is annual real GDP per capita for the period
1900 until 1994, for 17 OECD countries. Figure 1 shows the ¯rst di®erences of this data
in logarithms, ¢lnyit.
It can be seen that each series has a non-zero mean for each country in our sample, and
hence the data is either trend or di®erence stationary. For each country, we therefore
use an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to determine whether the non-stationarity
4The data is from (Maddison 1995) and is measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. Table 1 gives a
list of countries in the sample.
3Figure 1: Growth Rate of Real GDP:1901-1994









































present in the data is due to the presence of a unit root or a time trend. The results of
these tests, given in Table 1, show that for all countries, a unit root for lnyit cannot be
rejected.
It is, however, not easy to compare the mean growth rates directly from the time series
plots of ¢lnyit in Figure 1. To compare the means and distributions across countries
therefore, we report statistical boxplots of the data. These compare the distributions of
annual growth rates for each country over the sample time period, 1900-19945. Because
there were large disparities in the growth rates in the middle of the century, we break the
sample up into two periods: Period I which includes the years 1901-1939 and 1960-1994,
and Period II which includes the years 1949-1960. The resulting boxplots are given in
Figures 2 and 3. The country indexes are reported in Table 1.
5The boxplots report the interquartile range (IQR), the sample median and the minimum and max-
imum value. If any observation is less than 2 ¤ IQR below the ¯rst quartile or more than 2 ¤ IQR from
above the third quartile it is regarded as an outlier and depicted with a `+'.
4Table 1: Summary of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Results
Index Country t-stat Lag Length
1 Australia (AUS) -1.97 1
2 Canada (CAN) -0.12 1
3 France (FRA) -1.78 2
4 Germany (GER) -2.33 4
5 Japan (JAP) -1.51 2
6 Netherlands (NLD) -2.20 2
7 New Zealand (NZL) -2.09 1
8 Sweden (SWE) -1.90 1
9 United Kingdom (UK) -2.08 3
10 USA (USA) -2.80 1
11 Austria (AUT) -2.04 1
12 Belgium (BEL) -1.83 1
13 Denmark (DEN) -2.02 2
14 Finland (FIN) -2.43 1
15 Italy (ITY) -1.91 1
16 Norway (NOR) -1.88 1
17 Switzerland (SWT) -1.91 1
It can be seen from Figure 3 that the in the ¯rst and last part of the 20th Century,
there is substantial overlap of of the interquartile range (IQR) of the growth rates for
each country. There is substantially less overlap, however, for the middle part of the
century, 1949-1960. Thus, while it is not at all clear that the distribution of growth rates
are the same across countries, the data show that aside from the period around WWII,
the hypothesis is plausible and deserves further investigation. This leads us to formally
testing for equality of growth rates, and in particular, equality of mean growth rates
across the countries in our sample.
In the reminder of the paper we ¯rst describe how we proceed to obtain a more formal test
for equality of mean growth rates for the countries in our sample. In particular, we control
for serial correlation in the data using a simple autoregressive structure and control for
cross-country heteroscedasticity using a seemingly unrelated regressions framework. We
then o®er a discussion of the results and relate out ¯ndings to the existing literature.
5Figure 2: Distribution of Growth Rates by Country: 1901-1994















6Figure 3: Distribution of Growth Rates by Country: Subsamples



































73 Estimating the Trend Growth Rate
3.1 Serial Correlation and Persistence
An important limitation of the preceding visual inspection of the data is that we have not
allowed for serial correlation that is present in the data. In practice we expect the time
path of lnyit to exhibit some persistence in response to economic shocks. In particular
Mankiw et al. (1992) estimate the rate of convergence to the balanced growth path
(hereafter the rate of ¯ convergence) to be approximately 3% per year.6 This implies
that the half life of a deviation from trend is 24 years. Such strong persistence will make it
di±cult to obtain accurate estimates of the balanced path growth rate from observations
of GDP per worker over time.
Nevertheless, recent panel data studies by Knight and Villaneuva (1993), Islam (1995),
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), and Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997) ¯nd much faster
rates of ¯ convergence. These estimates range from 10-30% per year, implying half lives
between 2 and 7 years. Similarly, using time series data, Jones (1995) ¯nds that GDP in
OECD countries exhibits very little persistence. 7
Further, fast convergence rates are predicted by open economy growth models, such as
Foley and Sidrauski (1970). For example, Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) show that these
models generate convergence rates of 10% and higher, when they are calibrated so that
the the shadow price of capital equals observed ratios of ¯rms market value to capital
stock.8 Since the countries in our sample are best characterized as open economies, we
expect a priori that deviations of GDP per capita from its balanced growth path, exhibit
6This ¯nding is also predicted by closed economy neo-classical growth models, where the capital share
is interpreted broadly to include human capital.
7Also see Cook (2002) who obtains estimates of convergence rates of 0.4-0.6%.
8The key parameters in these models is the adjustment costs elasticities of capital and investment.
See Brainard and Tobin (1968) for a discussion of the interpretation of the shadow price of capital and
Tobin's q. Similarly, Landon-Lane and Robertson (2001) show that fast convergence rates are predicted
for these models for wide ranges of values of these parameters and for broad values of the capital share.
8little persistence.
One approach to thinking about the persistence of deviations of growth rates from their
long-run trend is via an error correction model. The error correction model can be repre-
sented as an in¯nite order autoregressive model whose coe±cients, due to the stationary
nature of the growth rate data, converge to zero as lag length grows. The in¯nite order
autoregressive model will be approximated by a ¯nite order autoregressive model of the
following form:
¢lnyit = 'i;0 +
Pi X
j=1
'i;j ¢lnyi;t¡j + ²it; (1)
where Pi is the ¯nite lag length, and ¢ represents the ¯rst di®erence operator.9 If
convergence rates are fast, the magnitude of the autoregressive parameters, will quickly
converge to zero. Hence (1) will be a good approximation to the an in¯nite autoregressive
process, even for small values of Pi. Equation (1) can therefore be regarded as describing
the growth rate of a range of endogenous and exogenous growth models that exhibit
a trend with some persistence in deviations from the trend. Assuming that ¢lny is







If there has been no change in the parameters that determine the balanced growth path,
then ¹i will simply equal the balanced path growth rate. In particular, using the neo-
classical growth model, we can interpret ¹i as the rate of labour augmenting technological
progress.
9A note containing a formal derivation of (1) from a general error correction growth model is available
from the authors upon request.
93.2 Trend Breaks
A second issue to consider is the possibility of breaks in the trend growth rate. It is
apparent that the balanced paths of the countries in our sample will not have been
constant over the entire 20th Century. In particular previous studies, such as Ben David
and Papell (1995), have found evidence of trend breaks in the growth rate for a similar
sample of countries.10 In view of this we begin by estimating the growth rate for relatively
small periods of 15 years each. We then test whether consecutive 15 year periods can be
aggregated into longer periods.
Thus, in order to obtain estimates of ¹ for particular subsamples, (1) is modi¯ed to








'i;j ¢lnyi(t¡j) + ²it (3)









Note that this assumes that only the trend growth rate changes between the di®erent
subsamples so that the persistence properties remain unchanged over the whole sample.
3.3 Testing for the equality of ¹ across countries
In estimating (1) or (3) we also need to account for any cross-sectional heteroscedasticity
and contemporaneous correlation. We therefore use the seemingly unrelated regression
10These center on WWI and WWII for war a®ected countries, and in the late 1920's for non war
a®ected countries.
10(SUR) estimator of Zellner (1962).11 The system is estimated using iterated feasible
generalized least squares (IFGLS), and value of the lag length Pi is chosen to minimize
Akaike's Information Criterion.
We then consider whether the trend growth rates, ¹i, are equal across countries. For a
given time period the null and alternative hypotheses are
H0 : ¹1 = ¹2 = ::: = ¹17 v: HA : ¹i 6= ¹j for some i 6= j: (5)
The null hypothesis is then tested using a non-linear Wald test.
4 Results
As anticipated, the test for equality of growth rates between the countries in our sample
was rejected for the whole period, 1904-94. The Wald statistic, reported in Table 2, was
29.46 with a p-value of 0.021, and hence the null can be rejected the 5% level. Next
we allow for trend breaks. We therefore divide the sample into six periods of approxi-
mately 15 years each, and estimate (3) for each period. If H0 cannot be rejected for two
consecutive periods, we then test whether the value of ¹ is constant across the adjacent
time periods. We then aggregate these adjacent periods where when we cannot reject
the hypothesis that ¹ is the same across time.12 This leads us to consider whether the
hypothesis of a common ¹ across countries can be rejected for two periods of approxi-
mately three decades each, 1904-30 and 1961-94. The de¯nitions of the ¯nal sub-periods
used and the results from the non-linear Wald tests can be found in Table 2 below.
It can be seen that for these thirty year periods, where the trend growth rate appears
11The hypothesis of a diagonal covariance matrix is rejected. The Breusch-Pagan LM test statistic for
a diagonal covariance matrix is 1186.1 and is distributed as Â2 with 136 degrees of freedom.
12The results for these 15 years periods are given in Appendix A, Table A.1.
11Table 2: Results from Wald Tests for equality of growth rates
Period Years Wald Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value
Test for Whole Sample
1904-1994 29.46 16 0.021
Tests within sub-periods
I 1904-1930 15.27 16 0.504
II 1931-1945 45.18 16 0.000
III 1946-1960 33.71 16 0.006
IV 1961-1994 15.76 16 0.470
Tests between sub-periods
I and II 60.59 33 0.002
II and III 85.73 33 0.000
III and IV 49.65 33 0.032
I and IV 39.18 33 0.212
to be constant for each country, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ¹ is the same
across countries. For both periods the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis
is approximately 50%. Hence for these periods, 1904-1930 and 1961-1994, we ¯nd no
signi¯cant di®erence in the trend growth rates of these 17 countries.
Finally we note that there is strong evidence that the sub-samples cannot be aggregated
further, since the tests for equality of growth rates between the adjacent periods are all
rejected at the 5% level.13 Thus these intervening years mark a clear break from the
parallel growth paths at the start and end of the century. Interestingly, the third panel
of Table 2 also shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the common value of
13Jones (1995) and Ben David and Papell (1995) conduct tests for di®erences in mean growth rates
on a country by country basis. Jones (1995) ¯nds no evidence for a shift in the mean growth rate for
the USA, but does ¯nd evidence of a mean shift in other OECD countries. Ben David and Papell (1995)
similarly ¯nd evidence of a shift in the mean growth rate for their sample, including the USA.
12¹ across countries for period IV (1961-1994) was the same as the common value across
countries for period I (1904-1930). Thus we cannot exclude the possibility that each
country has returned to the same balanced growth path that they began on at the start
of the century. Certainly we ¯nd little evidence that the trend rate increased or decreased
over the century.
5 Interpretation and Discussion
In contrast to much of the existing empirical growth literature, we have not attempted
to determine the signi¯cance of any particular explanatory variables. Rather, we have
asked a more fundamental question - are the measured di®erences in growth rates are
statistically signi¯cant? Our ¯nding is that they are not signi¯cant for most of the
last century, excluding only the WWII and post war recovery periods. This leads us to
question whether any relevant policy alternatives can place a country on a higher growth
path than other countries at similar levels of development.
To see this consider the broad alternative policy implications of countries having the
same long run growth rates. The possible explanations are that either: (i) there are
no politically feasible policies that can increase the national long run growth rate; (ii)
some feasible long run growth policies exist, but they were not implemented by any of
the countries in our sample; (iii) some feasible national long run growth policies ex-
ist, but these were all implemented by all countries, or; (iv) that any feasible national
long run growth policies, have equivalent e®ects on international growth rates, through,
for example, knowledge spill-overs and externalities from internationally traded capital
goods.
Of these possibilities, (ii) seems the least plausible. It is likely that if any politically
feasible growth strategies existed, they would have been undertaken by some government.
13The alternative, given in (iii), is that all the countries in our sample adopted the same
long run growth policies. If we rule out coincidence, this implies that there were no
politically feasible alternatives to these decisions. For example, radical tax reform might
potentially increase growth, but this is not on the political agenda of the countries in our
sample.14 Thus (i), and (iii) lead to the conclusion that there were no feasible alternative
policies that would have increased national growth rates.
The quali¯cation to this conclusion is given by (iv). If some of the di®erent policy
packages employed across countries did a®ect domestic growth rates, the results imply
that these must have had similar impacts on other countries in the sample. For example,
policies that a®ect the rate of scienti¯c research and the creation of new knowledge, might
also generate substantial international knowledge and productivity spill-overs. The range
of domestic factors that have such a strong international consequences, must be limited
however. For example, this may be a plausible description of the e®ects of the level of
subsidies to basic science in in large countries, such as the USA. For small economies
such, as Australia, New Zealand or Switzerland however, it is less plausible.
A second implication of our results relates to the convergence and catch-up hypotheses.
The results do not contradict previous studies that ¯nd that \catch-up" in income levels
occurred over last century, for many of these countries, (Baumol 1986). Speci¯cally we
reject the hypothesis that the trend growth rate was the same for each country, from 1904-
1994. Our results show, however, that catch-up was not steady, but was centered on the
middle of the century around WWII. This is consistent with Ben David and Papell ((1995)
and (2000)), who estimate trend breaks for OECD countries individually.15 Since catch-
up appears to be a result of a trend break however, it is likely that exogenous political
and social changes, rather than economic policy, may have been important factors in
determining the timing and extent of catch-up.
14Similarly, consider radical but inegalitarian education reforms.
15Time series tests of convergence, such as Bernard and Durlauf (1995) ¯nd evidence of convergence
among some pairs of countries only. See Durlauf and Quah (1999) for a survey of these results.
14Finally we consider the relationship between these ¯ndings and other empirical growth
literature. Our results indicate that each countries balanced path growth rate primar-
ily determined by international, rather than domestic factors. They therefore provide
compelling empirical support for recent models that emphasize the importance of inter-
national links in determining productivity growth, such as Eaton and Kortum (1996),
Parente and Prescott (2000) and Acemoglu and Ventura (2001). They are also consis-
tent with Jones (2002), who shows that the USA growth rate has been approximately
constant over the post war era, despite a very large expansion of research sectors in the
USA and the G5 countries.16
The results do not necessarily contradict models in which domestic policy choices can
explain the cross sectional variation in growth rates. As emphasized in the introduction,
they suggest that among developed market economies, the di®erences in education at-
tainment and R&D spending are not large enough to have a signi¯cant e®ect on their
relative growth rates. Hence these models appear to be less relevant to developed market
economies and more relevant to issues facing developing economies.
6 Conclusion
Many growth theories suggest that domestic policy choices are an important determinant
of national long run growth rates. Empirical support for these theories is mixed however.
We have considered an alternative empirical test that sets a minimum standard for any
theory of growth relating domestic policy to national long run growth rates. By esti-
mating the trend growth rates of 17 OECD countries, we found that for the ¯rst three
16The ¯nding of parallel growth paths also complements Evans (1998), who ¯nds that GDP from
1900-1994 among these countries is co-integrated. In contrast to Evans (1998), however, our results do
not reject the long run convergence hypothesis across the entire sample of countries in Maddison's data.
Moreover, our ¯ndings can be viewed as support for the premise of the Solow (1956) and Swan (1956)
model. They also provide additional evidence against the existence of scale e®ects as a determinant of
the long run growth rate, at the national level. See also Jones (1999).
15and last three decades of the century, the hypothesis that the trend growth rates are the
same across countries, cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of con¯dence. Thus,
except for the decades around WWII, there is no evidence of country speci¯c e®ects on
long run growth rates.
The results therefore have stark implications for the ability of most countries to determine
their own long run growth rates. The many policy packages used across these countries,
including di®erences in tax, research, education and investment, did not have signi¯cant
long run e®ects on relative growth rates. We conclude therefore that long run growth rates
are determined by international factors, and are insensitive to national policies, especially
for small countries. This implies severe restrictions of the ability of most governments
to increase national long run growth rates. Nevertheless our results provide empirical
support for a number of recent growth models that have emphasized the importance of
international links in determining national productivity growth.
16A Test Results for 15 year samples
Table A.1: Wald Tests for equality of ¹: 15 Year Periods
Period Years Wald-statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value
Tests within sub-periods
1 1904-1915 11.46 16 0.781
2 1916-1930 16.31 16 0.432
3 1931-1945 46.09 16 0.000
4 1946-1960 33.55 16 0.006
5 1961-1975 12.29 16 0.717
6 1976-1994 11.73 16 0.762
Tests between sub-periods
1 & 2 27.93 33 0.718
3 & 4 85.90 33 0.000
5 & 6 26.17 33 0.794
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